ABSTRACT This paper studies the secure degree of freedom (SDOF) of the multiway relay wiretap system K -user MIMO Y wiretap channel, where each legitimate user equipped with M antennas intends to convey independent signals via an intermediate relay with N antennas. There exists an eavesdropper which is equipped with N e antennas close to the legitimate users. In order to eliminate the multiuser interference and keep the system security, interference alignment is mainly utilized in the proposed broadcast wiretap channel (BWC) and multi-access BWC (MBWC), and cooperative jamming is adopted as a supplementary approach in the MBWC model. The general feasibility conditions of the interference alignment are deduced as M ≥ K − 1, 2M > N and N ≥ ((K (K − 1))/2). In the BWC model, we have deduced the secure degrees of freedom (SDOF) as K min{M , N } − min{N e , K (K − 1)/2}, which is always a positive value. While in the MBWC model, the SDOF is given by K min{M , N }. Finally, since the relay transmits the synthesized signals of the legal signal and the jamming signal in the MBWC model, we propose a power allocation scheme to maximize the secrecy rate. Simulation results demonstrate that our proposed power allocation scheme can improve secrecy rate under various antenna configurations.
I. INTRODUCTION
Due to the broadcast nature of the wireless communication, the security and the reliability are important problems facing to the information propagation. As an alternative of the cryptography, various physical layer security mechanisms inspired by Wyner's wiretap channel theorem [1] have been established by exploiting various physical layer characteristics such as spatial and spectral properties of wireless channels. Several existing physical layer security schemes including network coding and cooperative jamming have been proposed in different system models. For example, [2] proposed the secure transmission to protect the confidential messages in the mixed radio frequency (RF)/free space optical (FSO) network against a malicious eavesdropper with the key encryption and wiretap coding. In [3] , the authors investigated secure transmission in multiuser relay networks with cooperative jamming (MUCJ), and the secrecy rate, which represented the capacity difference between the legitimate channel and the eavesdropping channel, was improved compared with the non-jamming scheme. In [4] , cooperative beamforming and jamming scheme were applied to a multirelay wiretap system, and the beamformer design and power optimization problem were solved by a bisection method. In [5] , a wireless-powered friendly jammer was used to enable secure communication. In addition, cooperative beamforming and user selection was studied to improve the security in relay-aided systems [6] . While in [7] , a novel physical layer scheme was proposed for improving multiple users' information security (e.g., vehicle devises and mobile terminals) in the next-generation communication systems, and the node executed active jamming according to the realistic situation of this multi-user network for confusing the idle users/potential eavesdroppers. Besides, [8] investigated the physical layer security issue in the presence of a full duplex (FD) active eavesdropper, who launched jamming attacks to further improve the eavesdropping. Within a Y. Fan et al.: Physical Layer Security Based on Interference Alignment in K-User MIMO Y Wiretap Channels hierarchical game framework, the authors obtained the optimal strategy for both the legitimate transmissions and the jamming attacks. In the Internet of Things (LoT) communications, [9] designed the randomize-and-forward relay strategy specially for the secure multi-hop communications which was exposed to eavesdroppers with unknown number and locations.
However, inter-user interference is inevitable with the increasing number of the nodes under the simultaneous propagation process. Many researchers have investigated that interference alignment, which was crystallized by Jafar and Shamai in [10] and [11] , allows many interfering users to communicate simultaneously over a small number of signaling dimensions by consolidating the space spanned by the interference at each receiver within a small number of dimensions, while keeping the desired signals separable from interference so that they can be projected into the null space of the interference and thereby recovered free from interference. A precoding matrix in the transmitter and a receiving suppression matrix in the receiver are utilized to realize interference alignment in many applications. For example, in [12] , an efficient design of the feedback framework and a feedback-bit allocation algorithm for interference alignment were realized in the K-user multiple-input multiple-output (MIMO) interference channel. In addition, many researchers have provided insight into how the interference signals can be managed with the increasing users. The authors in [13] shew the feasible conditions of interference alignment in a symmetric multiple input multiple output (MIMO) system. In [14] , the authors studied the degree of freedom region of the MIMO Y channel by using linear beamforming and signal space alignment (SSA) schemes, where each user transmits a private message to each user in addition to a common message to all the other users.
In a multiuser wiretap network, we find that there is reasonable similarity of inter-user interference and cooperative jamming. Specifically, as one of the common physical layer security techniques, cooperative jamming is used to degrade the received signal at the eavesdropper but keeps independent of the legal signal at the destination. While interference alignment is also used to separate the interference and the useful signals at the legal destination. Thus, the interference can be used as the jamming signal to protect the legal destination, and many researchers have paid attention to exploiting interference alignment to guarantee security. As shown in [15] and [16] , the authors gave a clear overview of the research issues and challenges of the interference alignment and its application on physical layer security and so on. Furthermore, in [17] , anti-eavesdropping schemes were proposed based on the interference alignment that each user transmits a single-stream artificial noise which will disrupt the eavesdropping without introducing any additional interference to the legitimate transmission in the multiuser networks. Besides, the authors in [18] and [19] used interference alignment along with precoding to obtain the non-zero secure degree of freedom (SDOF) under the frequency/time selective K-user Gaussian interference channel with secrecy constraints. Besides, Xie utilized the real interference alignment and deduced the SDOF of the K-user Gaussian interference channels in [20] and [21] . In [20] , the SDOF in two-user interference channel with confidential messages is 2 3 , and the sum SDOF of the K-user multiple access wiretap channel is [21] , Xie deduced the SDOF of K-user interference channel with structured signaling, structured cooperative jamming, channel prefixing, and asymptotic real interference alignment. By interference alignment, the interference was aligned in a dimension independent of signal dimensions in legitimate nodes, but confounded the eavesdropper in the same signal dimensions in [20] and [21] . Recently, the authors in [22] investigated the secure degree of freedom in multiuser wiretap channels without the eavesdropper's channel state information at the transmitter (CSIT), and shew that the unavailability of the eavesdroppers CSIT does not reduce the s.d.o.f. of the wiretap channel with helpers.
Considering the relay multi-way wiretap networks, we expect to use interference alignment to manage the interuser interference and guarantee security. To the best of our knowledge, X. He and A. Yener have studied the SDOF in a two-hop secure communication system with an untrusted relay by cooperative jamming in [23] and [24] , and shew that the gap between the bound and the achievable rate is small when the relays power is larger than the power of the jammer and the source. Otherwise, many authors concentrated on deducing the DOF under different alignment schemes in [27] - [30] in a typical multiuser relay network which is called MIMO Y channel. The basic transmission process of the MIMO Y channel in [26] consisted of the multipleaccess (MAC) phase and the broadcast (BC) phase. In the MAC phase, each of the K users transmits K − 1 signals to the relay simultaneously and align the paired signals, i.e., the signal from the user i to the user j and the signal from user j to user i, in the same dimension at the relay. In the BC phase, the relay broadcasts the K (K −1)/2 dimension signals to all users, and each user obtains K − 1 useful signals by self-interference cancellation. In our previous work [25] , we have considered a specific scenario which adopted the real MIMO Y channel assumption and selected the transmit signals from designed PAM constellations, and further studied the lower bounds of SDOF with the information theory by using the real interference alignment.
A. MOTIVATION
Although interference alignment has been applied to the multiuser networks to ensure safety, the validity of interference alignment to resist tapping in multi-way relay networks has not been discussed in the MIMO Y network before. In order to study the relationship between the arbitrary complex transmit signals and secrecy performance in a complex MIMO Y channel, this paper attempts to present a complete analysis on the SDOF and the achievable secrecy rate. • As is proved in Section III, we find that interference alignment has the ability to overcome the wiretap in the BWC model, while in the MBWC model, it is essential to protect the transmission with both interference alignment and cooperative jamming.
• We deduce the SDOF of the BWC MIMO Y model and MBWC MIMO Y model based on the interference alignment and cooperative jamming. A transmission scheme which is termed as paired signal space alignment is adopted to eliminate the inter-interference in BC phase at each user, and a receiving interference suppression matrix at each receiver is used to detect legitimate signals.
• Since there is a trade-off between the legitimate achievable rate and the wiretap achievable rate, a power allocation scheme is further presented to maximize the secrecy rate through signal-to-jamming ratio coefficient. Comparisons are made among three different schemes of achieving the optimal solution of the above optimization problem.
The organization of the paper is as follows. Section II highlights the basic idea of the interference alignment in BWC MIMO Y wiretap model. In Section III, we propose the jamming-interference alignment scheme in the MBWC MIMO Y system model and derive the SDOF of this model. Besides, a power allocation scheme is proposed in Section IV and the simulation performance of this proposed power allocation scheme is evaluated in terms of secrecy rate in Section V. Section VI concludes the paper.
II. BWC MIMO Y WIRETAP MODEL AND INTERFERENCE ALIGNMENT
In this section, we consider a BWC MIMO Y wiretap system as shown in Fig.1 
The received signal at the relay is then expressed as
where Y r and n r are the N × 1 received signal vector and additive white Gaussian noise (AWGN) vector with the variance σ r 2 at the relay, respectively. In BC phase, the relay broadcasts the K (K − 1) received signals which are denoted as
where α is the relay amplified coefficient, and X r needs to satisfy the power constraint E[tr(X r X H r )] ≤ P. Then, the received signal by user j is given by
whereñ j = αH ru j n r +n j , n j is the local noise of user j, which is the additive white Gaussian noise (AWGN) vector with the variance σ j 2 . On the other hand, the received signal at the eavesdropper in BC phase is given by Y e
where n e is the N e × 1 additive white Gaussian signals (AWGN) with variance σ e 2 .
A. INTERFERENCE ALIGNMENT AND RECEIVING SUPPRESSSION SCHEME
Since the receiver U j does not only receive the expected signals from other K −1 users, but also receive the signals which are recognized as inter-user interference from other communication pairs in BC phase, we adopt a typical paired signal space alignment to eliminate the inter-user interference. The key idea of the paired signal space alignment is to precode s ij and s ji with a beamforming vector v ij and v ji respectively so that the two desired signal vectors are aligned at the relay in a same dimension. Different from [11] , a receiving suppression matrix is utilized in each receiver to jointly eliminate inter-user interference instead of the network-coding-aware interference nulling beamforming. In the MAC phase, each user transmits K − 1 precoding vectors to the other K − 1 users. For instance, each user conveys useful signals s ij , i, j = 1, 2, 3, . . . , K , i = j with the precoding vector v ij to the relay simultaneously. Thus, the relay sees K (K − 1) linearly transformed signals in total. If the number of the relay antennas is less than K (K − 1), i.e., N < K (K − 1), the relay cannot generally detect the overall K (K − 1) independent signal vectors coming from K users. To settle this problem, we should align the paired signals s ij and s ji from two users within the same spatial dimensions u i,j ∈ C N ×1 , i.e.,
Thus, the K (K − 1) independent codewords at the relay have compressed down to the half of the initial signal dimensions. Then, Y j can be equivalently rewritten as
where
represents the pair signals, wheres i,j = s ij +s ji . In (6b), it separates the useful signalsŨ jSj from interference signalsŪ jSj , wherẽ
. Besides, we denote the residual vectors out of the desired signals in U r and S r as the inter-user interference, i.e.,Ū j ∈
After the space signals alignment, user j decodes the signals by a receiving suppression matrix
For simplicity, let P j = F j H ru j ∈ C (K −1)×N , and then the Eq. (7) can be denoted aŝ
To eliminate the inter-user interferenceS j , we should design the equivalent receiving suppression matrix P j , which needs to satisfy the conditions shown in (10) and (11) at each intended receiver.
Obviously, P j is constructed so that the interference signalS j is restrained while the expected signalS j is reserved. Thus, the leftover signalŶ j in user j becomeŝ
and the desired signals {s 1,j , s 2,j , . . . , s j−1,j , s j+1,j , . . . , s K ,j } inS j can be obtained by self-interference cancellation. The following section will give the detailed description of the feasible conditions of interference alignment and zero-forcing conditions.
B. FEASIBLE CONDITIONS 1) INTERFERENCE ALIGNMENT FEASIBLE CONDITIONS
In this paper, we adopt the paired signal space alignment to reduce the required dimensions at the relay. The existence of the intersection subspace between MIMO Gaussian channel matrices has been verified in [29, Appendix I] . It is essential to review the related lemma [29, Lemma 1] . The purpose of this subsection is to illustrate that the paired signal space alignment can be realized with specific number of the users and the antennas at each node. Lemma: If A 1 and A 2 are N × M random matrices whose entries are drawn from i.i.d. complex Gaussian distribution CN (0, 1), there exists a max{0, 2M − N } dimensional intersection subspace between the two column spaces of A 1 and A 2 with probability one.
Therefore, if 2M > N , the rank of the null space of paired signal matrix is greater than one. The K (K −1) signals can be contained within
dimensional signal spaces.
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Then, we have the feasible conditions that N ≥
2) RECEIVING SUPPRESSION FEASIBLE CONDITIONS
The feasibility of (9) and (10) is equal to the existence of the zero forcing matrix F j or P j . In this part, we first declare the feasible conditions of (9), and then show the construction of P j which meets (10) . Note thatŪ j is independent ofŨ j .
In (9), P j is designed in the null space ofŪ j , i.e., U H j P j H = 0. It is easy to notice that a null-space exists in user j when N > (K −1)(K −2) 2 + 1, which has already been concluded in the interference alignment conditions N ≥
. Therefore,Ū H j P j = 0 is always satisfied. To ensure the feasibility of (10), we notice that rank(Ũ H j ) = min{K − 1, N } = K − 1, which means that there exists null space vector q j ∈ C N ×1 in the matrixŨ H j , i.e., U H j q j = 0. Then, we rewrite P j as the form of column vector, i.e.,
, which satisfies rank (A) = K . It means that the selected P j is independent of the null vector space ofŨ H j , i.e.,Ũ H j P j = 0. Therefore, we find that there always exists a P j satisfies the conditions of (9) and (10) simultaneously. As we have mentioned before, either exists F j .
C. SECURITY SCHEME AND SECURE DEGREES OF FREEDOM
When we use multiple antennas at both ends of communication links, the achievable channel rate can be increased due to multiple signal dimensions of space. The secure degrees of freedom is the crucial metric for characterizing achievable secrecy rate performance at high transmitting power with normalized noise power for multiple-antenna systems, i.e.,
where C s is an achievable secure rate, i.e.,
, C sum and C eve represent the sum achievable rate of K legitimate users and the eavesdropper, respectively. From (12), we note that the achievable SDOF is the difference between the achievable legal DOF D sum and the achievable wiretap DOF D eve . In this section, we investigate the SDOFs on the BWC wiretap model. The following theorem is the main result of this section.
Theorem 1: In a complex Gaussian BWC MIMO Y wiretap channel, K users are equipped with M antennas, a relay is equipped with N antennas and an eavesdropper is equipped with N e antennas. When N ≥ 
Then, the received signals in BC phase shown in (3) are represented as
whereH
Applying the cut-set theorem in [32] - [33] , the cut-set bounds in this scenario are expressed as
where I (A; B) represents the mutual information between random variable A and B. In the following analysis, the variance of the local noises of K users and the relay are assumed to be σ 2 . Assume that each legal user transmits signals with average power allocation, and the eigenvalue matrixes Q i,j equals to H i,j H H i,j when the row number of the H i,j is less than the column number. Otherwise, Q ij equals to H H ij H ij . Thus, the first term and the second term in (16) are written as
where Q u 1 r is related with H u 1 r , andQ ru 1 is related withH ru 1 .
The corresponding signal-to-noise ratios are denoted as Thus, by using (16)- (19) , the maximum degrees of freedom for information transferring from user 1 to the other cooperative K − 1 users can be deduced as
where d mn denotes the DOF from user m to user n. Similarly, the maximum degrees of freedom for information transferring from the cooperative K − 1 users to user 1 is
In addition, the degrees of freedom of other cases can be derived in the same method. Therefore, sum degrees of freedom of the whole legitimate users is obtained as
2) THE WIRETAP DOF AT THE EAVESDROPPER
In BWC MIMO Y wiretap channel, we find that the paired signal space alignment can also be used to guarantee security. In this section, we will prove above viewpoint with mathematical analysis. The signal received by the eavesdropper in (4) can be rewritten as Y e = αH re U r S r +ñ e = αH re U r S r1 + αH re U r S r2 +ñ e = αH re S r1 + αH re S r2 +ñ e (23) where S r has been defined before. Here, we rewrite S r as the sum of the paired signals which interfere with each other, i.e., S r = S r1 + S r2 , where
. The users can exploit the self-interference cancellation while the eavesdropper cannot distinguish S r1 and S r2 from S r , since each element of S r is a mixed signal in the same dimension. Then, the mutual information achieved by the eavesdropper is expressed as
. (24) The first term and the second term in (24) can be denoted as
min N e ,
where λ
[re] j represents the jth eigenvalue of the matrixQ re , andQ re is related withH re . The received SINRs at the eavesdropper are represented as SINR 1 = (25) and (26) into (24), we deduce the sum wiretap DOF 
III. MBWC MIMO Y WIRETAP CHANNEL WITH INTERFERENCE ALIGNMENT AND COOPERATIVE JAMMING
In BWC system model, we assume that the eavesdropper can only wiretap the signals in the second phase. Consider a more practical scenario, the eavesdropper can wiretap the signals from both MAC and BC phases, which is called MBWC wiretap model. As we have discussed before, interference alignment can guarantee secure communication in BC phase, but the useful signals transmitted in the MAC phase will be leaked out when the eavesdropper has enough antennas. Therefore, in order to achieve security in the MBWC MIMO Y system model, we propose to combine the cooperative jamming and the interference alignment technique together. In this section, we provide a description of the necessity of the cooperative jamming in this wiretap scenario under some certain cases. The communication process is shown in Fig.2 . In the MAC phase, each legitimate user transmits K − 1 signals to the relay and the relay broadcasts the jamming signal z simultaneously in Fig.2(a) . The relay is working in the full-duplex mode. In fact, it is now feasible to design near-perfect full-duplex relay. (e.g., see [34] - [37] and the reference therein). Then, the received signal at the relay is the same as (1), and at the same time, each user receives the jamming signal z given by
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where the jamming signal z is the N × 1 random Gaussian complex signal vector. The constraint of jamming power is E[tr(zz H )] ≤ βP, and β is the jamming power allocation coefficient within 0 and 1. The wiretap signal in this phase is denoted as
where H u i e are independent and identically distributed (
. In BC phase, as shown in Fig.2(b) , the relay broadcasts the received signals. Different from the BWC model, the transmit signals at the relay consist of the desired signal Y r and the jamming signal z, which can be expressed as X r = αY r + z, whereα 2 ≤ 1 − β, with the power constraint E[tr(X r X H r )] ≤ P. Then, the received signal by user j is given by
The wiretap signal in the BC phase is denoted as Y [2] e =αH re U r S r + H re z + n Proof: In this section, we investigate the secure degrees of freedom by deducing the DOF of the legitimate users and eavesdropper respectively.
1) DOF OF LEGITIMATE USERS
In MBWC MIMO Y system model, the legitimate users have received two signals from MAC and BC phases respectively: one contains pure jamming signal z, and the other one is the composite signal. Since the jamming signals sent in two phases are the same, the legitimate user j can obtain the useful signal X i by subtracting the receiving signals, i.e.,
which is equivalent to Eq.(3). Note that since the local noises have no effect on the DOF, we denote the equivalent local noise asñ j . In this way, the DOF of the legitimate user can be deduced with the same method as in Section II, and the SDOF is still K min{M , N }. 
The wiretap SINR at the eavesdropper is obtained in (34) , as shown at the top of this page, where σ e 2 andσ 2 e are the variances of the local noise n e andñ e .
In this case, the mutual information and the sum wiretap DOF are also shown in (35) and (36) = 0, the target sum SDOF can be obtained as
which means the whole system can obtain the overall SDOF and ensure safety in this network.
B. SDOF OF THE CASE β = 0
When jamming power allocation coefficient is zero, i.e., β = 0, the relay transmits the legal signals without the cooperative jamming signal. In this section, we investigate the SDOF and show the effect of the jamming power and interference alignment on the secrecy performance under different antenna configurations. When β = 0, the first received signal of (29) turns into Y [1] e = H e X+n e . In the BC phase, the eavesdropper wiretaps the signal as Y [ 
2] e
= αH re U r S r + n e , which has already been proved that the wiretap DOF equals to min{N e , K (K − 1)/2} in section II. Therefore, we need to discuss the wiretap DOF from Y [1] e , and the corresponding SINR is denoted as SINR β=0
Thus, the mutual information is
and sum D eve can be calculated as
where Q e is related with W 1 H e , and a j = λ
[e] j / min{KM , N e }. Overall, if no cooperative jamming signal is used in the MBWC MIMO Y wiretap model, the sum SDOF will become
As we have mentioned before, the feasible conditions of the interference alignment holds that N ≥
In this case, no matter how the users and the relay choose the antennas, the SDOF is always zero, which means that the SDOF only depends on the wiretap antennas, and the eavesdropper can wiretap all the signals. However, when N e ≤ K (K − 1)/2, the eavesdropper cannot decode all the legal signals in the limited receive space since the inter-user interference will weaken the intercept, so the SDOF becomes K min{M , N } − 2N e , which is a positive value under different antenna configurations. When Therefore, under the above certain cases when the SDOFs equals to zero, the cooperative jamming is essential for the secure communication.
Considering a case when β = 1, the relay only transmits the jamming signal. It indicates that the legitimate transmission is destroyed and the sum DOF of the legitimate users is always zero, i.e., D sum = 0. Under such circumstance, the eavesdropper only receives the jamming signals at the BC phase. Therefore, it eliminates the jamming signal in Y [1] e in (29) and obtains the legal signals, so the corresponding SINR β = 1 at the eavesdropper is given by
By using the same method, we can deduce that D eve = min{N e , KM }. It indicates that the eavesdropper can obtain the useful signals while the legal user can obtain nothing. Hence, the sum SDOF is zero. Under this extreme situation, the system cannot guarantee the reliable and secure transmission.
Above all, we summarize the main results about SDOF in BWC and MBWC MIMO Y wiretap models in Table 1 . From the table, we can clearly draw a conclusion: in BWC wiretap model, the whole system keeps secure by utilizing the interference alignment and gets up to the SDOFs of K min{M , N } − min{N e , K (K − 1)/2}. However, based on the linear combination of the two receiving signals from two transmission phases, a cooperative jamming scheme is essential in MBWC model. Moreover, the case β = 0 shows the feasible situations of using the cooperative jamming and the case β = 1 indicates a extreme scheme with no useful signals to the legitimate users. Apart from the above two cases, the system with any β jamming power ranging from 0 to 1 can ensure secure and stable communication.
IV. POWER ALLOCATION SCHEME IN MBWC SYSTEM MODEL
Although we treat the performance metric SDOF as the approximate representation of secrecy rate in the high transmitted power, the influence of the jamming power on the secrecy rate should be further discussed. If the jamming power increases, it is difficult for the eavesdropper to distinguish the useful signals out of the mixture signals, while at the same time, the power of the desired signals at the relay in BC phase will decrease heavily. On the contrary, the low jamming power will result in a better legal transmission performance but a poor anti-eavesdrop performance. Therefore, there is a tradeoff between the jamming power and the useful signal power at the relay for better secure communication, and how to allocate the cooperative jamming power has an effect on the secrecy rate in MBWC wiretap model.
In this section, a power allocation scheme is proposed to optimize the secrecy rate C s subjected to the power constraints. Since the second wiretap signal Y [2] e includes paired interference signals without useful information, we assume that the eavesdropper will only decode the first received signal Y [1] e , i.e., Y e = Y [1] e . Besides, the sum legitimate achievable rate of K users can be calculated with (16) and (17) by
Different from (18) and (19) , the SNRs in I (X i ; Y r |X 1 ) and I (Y r ;Ỹ i ) are given by SNR [1] = P i σ 2 , SNR [2] = (1−β)P σ 2 . I (X i ; Y r |X i ) and I (Y r ; Y i ) can be calculated in the same way as (18) and (19) , where SNR [3] = (K −1)P i σ 2 , SNR [4] = (1−β)P σ 2 . Besides, since the received signals at the eavesdropper consist of jamming signals, the wiretapped SINR is given by SINR = P βP+σ e 2 . By simplifying (42), the upper bound of C sum is given byC
Furthermore, the optimization problem is formulated as
Before we start to solve this optimization problem, we will prove it to be a convex optimization problem.
Proof : Assume that each legal user transmits signals with average power allocation, i.e., P i = P/K , i = 1, 2, . . . , K , and the variance of the local equivalent noise at the eavesdropper is σ 2 e = σ 2 . For simplicity, we rewrite some variables such as γ = P/σ 2 , b j = λ
Let f (β) = −C s , the optimization objective becomes min f (β), which is equivalent to maxC s , f (β) is a function depends on β.
Note that the constraint of the optimization problem 0 < β < 1 is a convex set. Then, we will prove that this objective VOLUME 5, 2017 function is a convex function. The first derivative of the f (β) versus β is given by
and the second derivative of f (β) versus β is expressed as
According to the convex optimization theory in [38] , both the objective function and the constraint are convex. Therefore, the optimization problem can be solved by CVX tools, and the achievable solution is called convex optimal value β 1 .
Besides, we intends to obtain the closed-form of the optimal solution. Thus, we set the
As shown in (47), the order of the equation mainly depends on the numbers of node antennas and users. Since the lowest equation order is six with the conditions K = 3, M = 2, N = 3 and Ne = 6, we cannot obtain a closed-form solution β of (47), neither do the other antenna conditions which will produce higher orders of the equation.
V. SIMULATION RESULTS
In this section, we present some selected numerical results to verify the secrecy performance by 10000 times Monte Carlo simulations. It is noteworthy that the number of users and the number of the antennas at each node should satisfy the conditions of the interference alignment, i.e., N ≥
First, we compare the secrecy performance between two power allocation schemes in Fig. 3 . Here, we assume that K = 4, M = 3, N = 6. When the number of the eavesdropper antennas is a certain value, the secrecy rate under our proposed power allocation scheme in red lines are the highest among these power allocation schemes. A group of fixed symmetrical coefficients β equals to 0.2 and 0.8 perform a little worse than the optimal one. Most importantly, the secrecy rate of the optimal scheme and fixed coefficient scheme grow linearly with the slopes about twelve, which are not affected by N e . Above all, the SDOFs under different situations match well with our theoretical analysis, and the secrecy performance improvement of the proposed power allocation scheme mainly comes from efficient utilization of the signal space so that the interference signals do not affect the network.
While considering the extreme case β = 0 in Fig. 4 , assume that K = 4, N = 6, we show the effects of the different antenna configurations on the secrecy rate and SDOF by four curves. First, when N e has enough antennas, i.e., N e > KM , such as M = 4, N e = 18, the secrecy rate and the SDOF are not influenced by the user and relay antennas and always keep zero. Thus, jamming power is essential to ensure safety under this occasion. Second, if the eavesdropper owns less antennas, i.e., K (K − 1)/2 < N e < KM , such as M = 4, N e = 8 and M = 8, N e = 10, it is affected by the inter-user interference and only wiretaps part of the legal signals. Third, when the eavesdropper has fewer antennas, i.e. N e < K (K − 1)/2, such as M = 4, N e = 5, the secrecy rate and SDOF are still above zero. Besides, the secrecy rate decreases heavily along with the increasing number of antennas at the eavesdropper. Therefore, that cooperative jamming is useful in the case when N e > KM in MBWC model, which is in accordance with the actual communication situation. When N e < KM , interference alignment has the predominance of anti-wiretap in BWC and MBWC models. Fig. 5 illustrates the secrecy rate of the proposed power allocation scheme according to various antenna configurations of the legal user and the relay. Assume that K = 4, N e = 6. When N =6, the secrecy performance improves with the increasing user antennas, and the slopes varies from twelve to twenty four, which are approximate to K min{M , N } in the high SNR region. Besides, the blue lines represent two different configurations under M =5 when Ne < KM , M < N < 2M . We notice that the increasing number of the relay antennas enhances the secrecy performance while keeps the SDOF steady, which can be reflected by the parallel lines such as the blue solid line and dashed line in the high SNR region. It also indicates that the relay antennas affects the overall secrecy rate. 6 shows the relationship between the secrecy rate and the transmit SNR under three different β values. In this paper, we propose three methods to settle the optimization problem. Apart from the convex optimal value β 1 , we have obtained a polynomial calculated solution called β 2 with the help of the calculation tools. Besides, we find the ergodic optimal value β 3 by exhaustive search with a searching precision 0.01 from 0 to 1, which has the highest complexity. It is quite clear that there exists an improvement in the secrecy rate along with the transmitted power, and we can obtain almost the same secrecy performance by using these three β values. In addition, more users enhance the system secrecy rate. Fig. 7 and Fig. 8 investigate the variation trends of power allocation coefficient along with the number of the legitimate users and the number of the user antennas, respectively. In Fig. 7 , K ranges from 3 to 6, and M = 3, N = 9, N e = 18. There are three groups of curves on behalf of different transmit SNRs, i.e., SNR=10dB, 15dB, 50dB. The jamming power allocation coefficient β increases with VOLUME 5, 2017 the SNR under the fixed K and decreases with the number of the users in each transmit SNR. If the legal users transmit signals with more power, the system needs more jamming power to ensure safety. It also indicates that when the number of legal user increases, less jamming power is needed at the relay since the increasing inter-user interference can help the system keep security in BC phase. Besides, we can indicate from Eq. (47) that if M ≤ N , the jamming power does not depend on the number of the relay antennas, which is consistent with the simulation results. In Fig. 8 , we consider a MIMO Y network with K = 3, N = 9, N e = 18, and M ranges from 3 to 6. When SNR is fixed, the number of the user antennas and the jamming power is in an inverse proportion, which means that more legal user antennas leads to more inter-user interference. Since the eavesdropper is influenced by the inter-user interference, the whole system can guarantee security mainly by interference alignment. When the eavesdropper utilizes more antennas, the relay needs to transmit more jamming power to resist the wiretap.
VI. CONCLUSION
This work investigated the secure degrees of freedom of a typical multiway relay wiretap network called K-user MIMO Y system. Through the theoretical analysis, in the proposed BWC model, we found that interference alignment was really effective in secure communication. While in MBWC model, it was essential to adopt the cooperative jamming as a supplementary measure to overcome the wiretap. Besides, a jamming power allocation scheme was formulated in MBWC model which was to maximize the secrecy rate with the power constraints of each transmitting nodes. Simulation results indicated that the proposed power allocation scheme outperformed the fixed power scheme, and the secrecy performance in high SNR region matches the conclusion of SDOF under different antenna configurations. It also demonstrated that when the number of legal user increases, the relay allocates less jamming signals since the increasing inter-user interference can help the system keep security. 
